By Bill Leonard
As noted earlier in this space, recent polls give evidence of a dramatic increase in the number of Americans who self-identify as having no religious affiliation — with their share of the population up from 7 to nearly 17 percent in the last few years. These individuals, identified as “nones” in the new book American Grace by Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell, require serious attention from persons who remain engaged in religious communities.
If the nones are increasing — and apparently more people are at least willing to claim that designation — then who are they and what might their identity suggest for the church? Putnam and Campbell offer some insightful initial responses drawn from studying a variety of polls:
- While drawn extensively from a “post-Boomer” constituency, nones actually reflect a profile similar to other Americans educationally and socially. There are slightly (but not significantly) more males, whites and non-Southerners; they do not represent a clear social anomaly.
- While religiously non-affiliated, they are largely unwilling to identify as completely “non-religious” atheists or agnostics. This may reflect the influence of the “spirituality movement” on individuals who pursue religious reflection, contemplation and literature but not in traditional settings.
- Nones apparently come from both religious and non-religious family backgrounds. While many were not reared in religious communities, some were — but have chosen to disengage.
- Nones tend to reflect ideas and values that are somewhat left-of-center on the ideological scale, and their rise parallels the expansion of the religious/political Right. Many are younger Americans who, as one study shows, see religion “as judgmental, homophobic, hypocritical and too political.” (pg. 121)
In one of their most intriguing observations, Putnam and Campbell conclude: “Because the rise of the new nones was so abrupt, this increase seems unlikely to reflect secularization in any ordinary sense, since theories of secularization refer to developments that transpire over decades or even centuries, not just a few years” (pg. 127). Blaming secularism won’t account for the dilemma. This observation leads the authors to ask whether the increase of nones is at least in part evidence of a “backlash against conservatism.”
“Backlash,” however, may not be the only appropriate way to describe the nature of “none-ness.” Perhaps the new nones are another evidence of the new pluralism, a reality that religious communities across the theological spectrum need to confront, and soon. The new pluralism means that religious and non-religious diversity is so extensive — so widespread — that those who challenge it can sound more like bigots than faithful dissenters. In fact, for many people (apparently some of the nones), what sounds like conviction in many communities of faith may appear as bigotry when such rhetoric enters the public square.
The new pluralism means that sectarian declarations regarding ethics, dogma or religious experience may turn persons away as readily as it draws them in. It may indicate that, for many people, the “culture wars” are ending not with a bang, but with a whimper. Religious communities right and left have declared themselves — and a certain segment of the population has gotten the message, quietly choosing to walk away.
That reality may be a factor in yet another poll that appeared in the last few weeks. This one, from the Gallup organization, indicates that, while 54 percent of the Americans surveyed believe that religion is important in their lives, some 70 percent suggest that “religion is losing its influence in American life” — one of the highest such figures in the history of Gallup’s studies. While this data is not necessarily dire — these attitudes have fluctuated greatly, historically, in American life — when combined with the statistics on the nones it should at least be sobering to religious groups large and small. Whatever else, it suggests that a distinct religious identity is becoming increasingly less normative in American life.
Does all this mean that faith communities should cease addressing the larger culture on the basis of conscience and conviction? Of course not. But it does mean that they should know where their declarations and actions may take them in terms of popular perception and public response.
It may also mean that, as religious pluralism sweeps every corner of the culture, then there can be no real “mainline” American religion. Every faith tradition has the freedom to articulate its vision (dare we say its “witness?”) publicly and privately, even as it is forced to recognize that no one religious communion can establish, demand or secure cultural dominance. Such pluralism suggests that the voices of religious institutions and individuals may be both present and limited in the marketplace — a reality that is hitting many Protestant groups hard.
Ultimately, however, the nones may be a blessing in disguise, compelling the church to revisit, review and recover the meaning and method of its primary witness in the world. (More about that later.)